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y he five essays pieseated here have the great ment of taking
^ seriously what the objects of their study—Americans,
Englishmen, and Frenchmen of the late eighteenth century,
for the most part—said and thought they were doing. While not at all
innocent of the need to bring a theoretical perspective to the study of
the past, they have so arranged things that their respective contribu
tions to historical interpretation emerge as naturally as possible from
the well-irrigated soil of source and evidence. Three of the es-
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says—those by Rahe, Hammersley, and Samuelson—^put the emphasis
upon ideas; the other two, by Bossenga and Engel, on institutions. All
five authors give special attention to the revolutionary transformations
of the Atlantic world of the 1770s and 1780s.
Also noteworthy about these essays is how each one pursues a
transnational perspective for understanding its specific topic. Samuelson reveals a genuine and rather unsuspected dialogue between an
American and an Englishman at the very moment of the American
crisis leading to independence. Rahe shows how the constitutionalism
of the American founders responded to a perspective created by
English and French thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Hammersley, slightly adjusting the picture, highlights the
American and French appropriation of English constitutional ideas.
Engel depicts the transplanting of a German institution in American
soil. Even Bossenga, who comes closest to a one-country perspective,
adverts appropriately to the English alternative facing her struggling
French administrators.
Readers of these essays will also be struck by the degree of
substantive overlap among them. The Englishman James Harrington
is one of the numerous names who appears in three of the five essays
(Rahe, Samuelson, and Hammersley), and the American John Adams
is another. The broader theme of forging new beginnings is even more
prevalent in the articles presented here. Rahe's essay on the founding
is an obvious case, but Samuelson's study of the debate in America in
1775-76 is another, as is Hammersley's study of Adams's and Rutledge s adaptation of Harrington's views on the founding of new
regimes. Engel shows us a spectacle of dedine rather than origination,
a useful reminder that the "age of revolution" was also, in some
contexts, an age of maturation and even of loss. For her part, Bossenga
ends, as it were, at that meta-beginning known as the French Revolu
tion. However disparate and individualixed these papers are, both in
method and content, readers will find in them a remarkable robustness
of shared assumptions and common commitments.
Rachel Hammersley's book 'French Revolutionaries and English
Republicans: The Cordeliers Club, 1790-1794 (Woodbridge: Royal
Piistorical Society—Boydell and Brewer, 2005) offers a close and
illuminating analysis of foe place of foe English republican tradition in
foe thought of one of foe most decisive of foe various "clubs" to seixe
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hold of the French Revolution as it passed through its process of
increasing radicalization. That work contributes to a certain "revision
ist" tendency of the past thirty years to take seriously the political
dimension of that epochal event. In the essay presented here,
Hammersley broadens the perspective both chronologically and
geographically. In doing so, she intervenes in two large and continuing
scholarly controversies: first, the relationship between the American
and French revolutions; and second, the role of English thought in the
inspiration and intellectual formation of both. Her suggestion is that
English thought was a prominent and. neglected factor in late
eighteenth-century Franco-American political life, and that it was
English republicanism rather than English liberalism that was most
decisive in both these revolutionary episodes.
Comparing the American founder John Adams with the lessknown French revolutionary Jean-Jacques Rutledge (1742-94),
Hammersley finds them both to have been steeped in republican
thought in particular and English seventeenth-century ideas—especially
those of James Harrington—^in particular. She argues that Adams'
engagement with Harrington was lifelong, and that the latter "appears
to have held a central place in Adams's thought." In addition to
specific proposals such as annual elections, rotating offices, the
separation and balance of powers, Hammersley finds in Adams a
deeper affinity for Harrington as the preendnent theorist of what might
be called a passions-and-interests-based, rather than a virtue-based,
republicanism. Harrington's insistence upon the need for a "govern
ment of laws, and not of men" resonated with Adams's somewhat
Puritan pessimism on human nature, and led to a particular emphasis
upon the need for institutional mechanisms to check the wayward
tendencies of individual character. Adams's famous notion of the
"natural aristocracy" is a direct outgrowth, she finds, of this engage
ment. Even the name the "commonwealth of Massachusetts" reflects,
she suggests, his close reading of Harrington's "commonwealth of
Oceana."
The Franco-Irish Rutledge, who spent most of his life in France
and became active in the Cordeliets Club (which claimed Danton,
among others, as a member) during the Revolution, also found
Harrington's pessimistic republicanism a welcome alternative to the
virtue-steeped variety pushed relentlessly by the Jacobin Clubs. But

306

1650-1850

vinlike Adams, Rutledge, in the heat of the democratizing episode of the
radical French Revolution, had no use for a natural aristocracy, and his
own model constitution represents a "democratized" version of the
Englishman's ideal republic. Perhaps the culmination of Harrington's
influence in France occurred in 1795, when his works were first
translated into French, and when both sides of the debate over a new,
post-Robespierrist constitution—^both Boissy d'Anglas on the one
hand and abbe Sieyes on the other—drew inspiration from the English
republican who had rested his scheme on the representation of
property-owning citizens.
Richard Samuelson puts one of the seminal documents of the
American revolutionary era in a fresh perspective. Thomas Paine's
Common Sense, he reminds us, was not the only work by that title to be
produced by the crisis of 1774—75. The English merchant and phil
anthropist Jonas Hanway had written a work by the same name a year
or so earlier, which Paine "all but certain|ly]" knew. Juxtaposing the
two works, Samuelson argues, helps illuminate what the AngloAmerican controversy was all about.
Both authors, Samuelson finds, wrote out of an impatience with
the legal-constitutional mode of discourse that had been predominant
in the years leading up to the rebellion. Both authors intended
'common sense" as an alternative framework for transatlantic
discussion. Both authors bypassed the tradition of intricate institu
tional mechanisms running from Harrington through Montesquieu and
his English epigones, and instead appealed to broader sources of
allegiance. Specifically, "the problem of nationhood," Samuelson
writes, "concretized the problem of empire in an era of constitutional
change." For the real question that divided Paine and Hanway was:
What was a nation? Nationalism became British, rather than merely
English, in the course of the century after the Glorious Revolution of
1688, and at the same time it became imperial. "To be a Briton,''
Samuelson concludes, summarizing Hanway's common sense, 'Svas to
be subject to Parliament."
Juxtaposing Hanway and Paine makes clear how much of Paine's
own treatment of the subject was a mere adaptation of British
understandings he tacitly accepted. Paine's famous distinction between
society and government is profitably viewed as a way of avoiding
Hanway's tight linkage between history, legal and political instititutions.
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and the obligations of the subject. For Paine, "societ7 was the entirety
of colonial internal affairs; government was the imperial power,
exercised by the King across the water." Likewise, Paine tacitly
accepted much of the British understanding, articulated by Hanway, of
the purposes of empire. For Hanway, the "essence" of that empire
would be "peace, trade, and liberty." For Paine, we are told, "only a
continental American union covdd serve the ends of British empire in
America." Again, the foreign policy visions of the two authors are
similarly joined at the hip. As Samuelson puts it, "Britain turned to its
American empire in order to escape the wars of Europe; America,
Paine suggested, should make its own empire of liberty in order to
escape from Britain's European wars." The rhetoric of common sense
had the effect, in both the Englishman and the American (who himself
had been an Englishman until 1774), of bringing to the surface some
of the most fundamental assumptions about collective identity and
participation on either side of the Adantic.
In a sweeping meditation that in some ways builds upon his
monumental RepublicsAncient andModern (University of North Carolina
Press, 1992), Paul Rahe looks at the American constitutional founding
from quite another point of view as a synthesis, an intermediate option,
between an ancient "politics of trust" and the new "politics of distrust"
born with Machiavelli and with his English followers from Hobbes
through Harrington, Caio's Letters, Montesquieu and Hume. The
"politics of trust" in Greek republicanism—^whether articulated by
Pericles, Aristode or Polybius—^hinged upon at least two critical
elements, the virtue of the citizens and the social and educational
models by which that virtue was formed and replicated. In particular,
the distribution of offices and honors, indicating as it does the
"qualities that are to be honored in the city," maintain and reproduce
what is permanendy valued in the constitution of the Greek republic.
Thepoliteiais shaped bypaideia, for at bottom, Rahe argues, the Greeks
"thought less in terms of institutions than in terms of character."
The "politics of distrust" that began with Machiavelli saw things
differendy. These thinkers saw human beings as irremediably subject
to personal passions and private interests, and doubted that reason, of
the lofty Aristotelian sort, could carry the polity very far. Thus, they
looked for more structural methods of passing political order from one
generation to the next. It might be by allowing the people to make
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trouble for the naturally ambitious elites (Machiavelli), or by empower
ing an absolute government to suppress tumults of all kinds (Hobbes),
or by separating the deliberating from the deciding function in a
bicameral commonwealth (Harrington). With Harrington, the em
phasis settled decidedly on the establishment of distinct institutions
that would somehow jostle against each other on their way to a general
equipoise. Cato'shetters, Montesquieu and Hume all gave voice to some
version of this essential Harringtonian approach.
Like Hammersley, Rahe sees Adams in particular as inheriting
much from a tradition spearheaded by Harrington. But where
Hammersley saw the Englishman's influence as direct and unmitigated,
Rahe sees it as highly mediated by these eighteenth-century interlocu
tors. Indeed, he finds the American founding as a whole to represent
neither a pure "politics of trust" nor a "politics of distrust," but a
hybrid, a kind of mixed regime, an intermediate position, though one
closer to the modern paradigm. To be sure, the famous institutional
safeguards against the passions and interests of ambitious and factionprone men—the bicameral legislature, the separation of powers, the
checks and balances buUt into the federal system itself—^bespeak the
distinctly modern concerns of Harrington and his eighteenth-century
followers. But in at least two ways, Rahe finds the Federalist to
incorporate elements of a more classical constitutionalism.
First, "it is self-consciously aristocratic and classical in character:
for it presupposes a capacity for logos on the part of some men," and
provides them a field for its exercise. Second, it also attempts to instill
an elevating pride and ambition in its agents through its distribution of
public offices and honors. Here, Rahe cites Montesquieu's discussion
of the complex and variegated ways in which honor, as the reigning
"spirit" of monarchical government, was employed to bring the
passions of men into line with the interests of the laws and the stability
of the regime—a discussion adapted by the Americans to their own
circumstances to encourage both the personal loyalty of the officials
and the coUegial spirit within each branch of government. Both of
these factors would be critical to the functioning over time of the
federal system. The result is that the federal constitution itself ended
up providing the paideia necessary to give the looked-for permanence
in the American constitutional system.
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Kate Engd's essay reminds us, if reminder were needed, that each
community experienced its own history in the Adantic dghteenth
century, and that if the new American nation as a whole was looking
upward and outward, some communities, such as the Moravian town
of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, were actually experiencing decline during
this same period. Mounting debt, diminishing population, and above
all a loss of the cohesion that had attended its founding in the 1740s
awaited Bethlehem upon the cessation of hostilities with Great Britain
in 1783.
Engel mounts a wide-ranging critique of the so-called "dedension" modd of historical change as it applies to the Moravian commu
nity. Dating to Perry Miller's work on Puritan New England, this
theory has daimed that the religious commitment and community
cohesion of early New England towns were eroded by the growth of
a capitalist economy—with its secularism, individualism, and material
ism. Though the theory has come under revision for the field of New
England history, it is still strong, Engel writes, as an overall model of
early American religious history.
In Bethlehem, however, she finds the theory to be fundamentally
wanting. Bethlehem's economy had been run as a communal house
hold from its founding in 1744 until the abrogation of the formal
household institutions "on the directive of German Moravians" in
1761. Focussing on the controversy that arose when a community
elder. Bishop John Ettwdn—returning to the town after being away for
many years—^resisted an ambitious plan to build a bridge across the
Lehigh river in 1792, Engel investigates whether the views of the local
leadership toward economic progress were any different from what
they had been thirty years or so before. What she concludes is that in
each of three key areas—the move to private financing, the adoption
of a corporate structure for managing the enterprise, and the commer
cial contacts with the outside world that the bridge project were
expected to generate—the bridge proposal was well within theaccepted
practices and traditions of the town for decades.
Bishop Ettwein was neither alone nor mistaken, she finds, in
seeing an erosion in communal cohesiveness on his return to the city
in 1792. The real reason for this development, however, she discerns
not in the corrupting influence of the market economy, but in the
overlooked yet crucial changes in the religious mission of the town.
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Bethlehem had begun with a mission to reach out to neighboring
Indian peoples. That mission, Engel reports, had generated a vital
community and economic life among the inhabitants in Bethlehem. As
the Indians left the area for a variety of reasons after the 1760s, and as
the Moravian leadership streamlined its outreach to other communities
in the Western hemisphere, Bethlehem was simply left with much less
to do. This is what caused the loss of demographic and economic
prosperity, as well as of community cohesiveness, by the time of
Ettwein's return. "Bethlehem waned when it lost its missions, not
when it changed its economy," she concludes.
The sweeping Atlantic network of which Bethlehem was a part,
and which had nurtured it in its early days—^with its missions and
communities in places as far-flung as Surinam, Labrador, and the
Danish West Indies, as well as North American settlements such as
Bethlehem itself—^also became its undoing when the contours of that
ambitious missionary enterprise changed in thelate eighteenth century.
The community had thrived and prospered because of its religious
identity and the vitality of the institutions it had developed to foster
that identity, and it decUned for the same reason.
In a wide-ranging synthesis, the longest essay in this collection,
Gail Bossenga offers an institutional account of the origins of the
French Revolution. Revisionist historians inspired by Alexis de
TocqueviUe's The Old Regim an the Evolution (1856) have long empha
sized the ways in which the monarchy, through its policies and its
institutions, both leveled the French population and heightened the
status differences among them. As Fran9oise Melonio and the late
Francois Furet once put it, "The monarchy repressed all the king's
subjects while selling them exemptions from its laws. It constantly
recreated equality and inequality, fortifying each of the two passions by
its opposite. It created the conditions for the tabula rasa of '89."*
Bossenga. echoes this essential revisionist perspective, while
attempting to go beyond it. Finding a certain "conceptual void" in
revisionist treatments of social reality, she aims to retrofit and amplify
the study of institutions to fill that void. By looking at the complex and

' Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Re^e and the Rtvoktion, ed. and intro. Frangois Furet and
Fian^oise Melonio, trans. Alan S. Kahan (University of Chicago Press, 1998, 2001), 2 vols.,
1:34.
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dynamic relationship between markets and public institutions, in
particular, she seeks to "insert social history back into" the historiogra
phy of the French Revolution after the recent "linguistic turn."
Looking at instititutions as embodiments of status, and viewing
status not in statically descriptive but in active terms as an avenue to
political and economic resources, offers the possibility, Bossenga
argues, of seeing the chief meaning of the French Revolution in a new
way. That it was not a victory of a rising capitalist bourgeoisie over a
declining feudal nobility is now broadly agreed. But the standard nonMarxist argument of Roland Mousnier, that a status-based society was
replaced in the Revolution by a class-based one, Bossenga also finds
wanting. Instead, close attention to the place of status and the
overwhelming influence of privileged institutions before 1789 leads to
the conclusion that the Revolution actually saw the replacement of a
"patrimonial" political culture with one based on citizenship, with its
aggressively demarcated boundaries between the public and private
spheres.
Patrimonialism, a concept Bossenga derives mostly from Max
Weber and which is most frequently deployed today by political
scientists in the study of developing states, means that the resources of
state power are held notably in private hands. She follows this
variation on a Tocquevillian theme, with its emphasis upon the
multidimensional importance of privilege, through a probing treatment
of civil offices, the army, fiscal offices and the national debt, among
other redoubts of the French old regime. The result, she concludes, is
a rather marbled effect, a sort of double helix of market reciprocity, on
the one hand, with its egalitarian undertones, and private ownership in
public functions based on a hierarchically based system of status, on
the other, that reveals the true "contradictions" of the old-regime
French political and social order. Office-holders put increasing
pressure on the government to apply the emerging standards of
property ownership to their tenure of public office. Thus, "solidifica
tion of property rights in offices laid the foundation for a huge
expansion of the market in offices," and far from modernization
resulting, the system "bred institutional tensions" that paved the way
for revolution.
One dimension of the collision between market reciprocity and
traditional status was the "creation of monopolistic markets" that
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benefitted those with the status to enjoy access to power. "The legal
arrangements of seigneurialism," Bossenga writes, "distorted emerging
markets by creating arbitrariness and undermining secure property
rights," a condition that led to a proto-revolutionary frustration, clearly
visible In the cahiers des doleances (the lists of local grievances solicited by
the king) in 1789. The "cash nexus," far firom separating and clearly
distinguishing public from private as a certain kind of modernization
theory woxald have it, instead deepened the confusion between them
because the system of venal offices "conflated rights of jurisdiction and
property." Thus, whereas the basis for patrimonial absolutism was
undercut in England by the revolutions of the seventeenth century and
the emergence of parliamentary control over the legal and fiscal
systems, France was increasingly trapped inside a contraption of its
own devising, the whole machinery of what several scholars have called
"court capitalism."
In the mihtary, venality confounded the development of a distinct
public authority both on the battlefield and at Versailles by giving venal
office-holders "independence in relation to their superiors." The same
story emerges in the farming out of the collection of public taxes to
private entities through the offices of farmer-general and receivergeneral among others. And perhaps most importantly of aU, the
inability of the government to get control of the public debt, a debt that
eventually brought the regime to the brink of bankruptcy and that
precipitated the calling of the Estates General in the late 1780s, was a
function of the confusions between public and private in France's
patrimonial state. In many cases, the real fault lines of conflict were
not between a declining nobility and a rising bourgeoisie but between
court-connected nobles who had the resources and the status markers
to access the prestigious offices, and less-endowed country nobles who
did not. The reformers and would-be reformers of the system also
came from the very highest echelons of the status hierarchy, leading
Bossenga to conclude that the attempts to manage the system consti
tuted a case of "the State against itself."
Each of these five essays, then, provides a fresh perspective on the
revolutionary era of the Atlantic world of the late eighteenth century,
and each does so by focussing on the ideas or the institutions germane
to the author's topic. For Hammersley, the English Revolution of the
seventeenth century produced conceptual models—notably that of
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James Harrington—that would prove resonant for both the American
and French Revolutions of the late eighteenth. For Samuelson, the
"common sense" of the American independence movement was
accompanied by conceptions of nation and empire subtly and interest
ingly different from those animating British supporters of continued
union. For Rahe, the American Revolution was the occasion for the
authors of the Federalist to rethink what a rich tradition had to say about
the relationship between character and institutions. For Engel, the
American Revolution and new constitution were followed immediately
not by a brighdy hopeful future but by a period of decUne. And for
Bossenga, the failure of the French monarchical state to develop public
institutions that could separate themselves effectively from an
increasingly vibrant private sphere led to the Revolution. All five of
these essays will provide ample food for thought for those interested
in the role of ideas and institutions at one of the watershed moments
of the modern world.

